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Abstract 
 
 I examine investors’ reaction to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions in 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry from 2002 to 2008. Over this period, 
investors anticipate the announcements, as demonstrated by the fact that the cumulative 
abnormal returns are not statistically significant. In addition, I test to determine the effect 
of excess capacity on investors’ reactions. From 2002 to 2004, investors do not recognize 
acquisitions as a response to excess capacity, as the excess capacity measures utilized 
have no effect on the size of the cumulative abnormal return. From 2005 to 2008, 
however, excess capacity measures have a positive effect on cumulative abnormal return, 
indicating that investors started to recognize the threat of excess capacity and acquisitions 
as a response to that threat.  
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Introduction 
 Since the birth of the industry, big pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies 
have been fully integrated machines, motivated by the search for the next blockbuster 
drug (defined as a drug whose sales exceed $1 billion). As described by former 
GlaxoSmithKline CEO, Jean-Pierre Garnier, the business model is simple – “new 
products are discovered, developed, launched, and protected by various patents” (Garnier, 
2008). Typically, products are protected for ten to twelve years before the patent expires 
and products face competition from generic drugs. At this point, revenues from the drug 
drop off and the search for the next blockbuster commences (Garnier, 2008). Big 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms are forced to focus on constant replacement of 
their pipeline. This is an incredibly difficult task, as product success is not just a function 
of enormous firm investment – compounds are subject to extensive clinical trials and 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.  
The past decade appears to have been a successful period for the industry, as 
“average sales for a recently launched drug grew by nearly 50%, and more than 30 
achieved coveted ‘blockbuster’ status” (Booth et al., 2004). However, the past decade has 
also demonstrated how unsustainable the big pharmaceutical and biotechnology business 
model has become. Research and development productivity, the ratio of research and 
development expense to the number of approved drugs, is at an all-time low. The 
industry’s research and development investment has grown from $2 billion in 1980 to 
$43 billion in 2006. Over the same period, however, the number of drugs approved by the 
FDA has remained the same (Garnier, 2008). It is expected that the blockbuster drug 
2 
 
 
model will deliver a weak 5% return on investment, with only one out of six new drugs 
likely to deliver returns above their cost of capital (Gilbert et al., 2003). 
Many factors have been identified as the cause of this serious decline in research 
and development productivity. Most importantly, research and development costs have 
mushroomed – it has been estimated that the average drug, including its launch, costs 
close to $1.7 billion (Gilbert et al., 2003). Every aspect of drug development has become 
more expensive, from the construction of laboratories to the discovery of new chemical 
compounds (Booth et al., 2004). In addition, it is simply more challenging to develop 
drugs for the diseases that have not been addressed thus far. Clearly, the diseases that are 
most easily cured have already been overcome (Garnier, 2008). Certainly this issue is 
related to the previous mention of increased costs – the more difficult compounds to 
discover are also those that are more expensive to discover. The industry believed the 
advances made in genomics would greatly mitigate the issue of discovery (Booth et al., 
2004). However, this advancement has not proven to deliver significant results. This 
issue can only be tackled by substantially more efficient discovery practices. 
Finally, the passing of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 greatly simplified the 
procedure competing firms must go through to develop generic drugs (Garnier, 2008). 
These firms only need to prove bioequivalence (that the active ingredient in the generic 
drug is absorbed at the same rate as the brand-name drug) in order to be approved by the 
FDA (Higgins et al., 2006). This dramatically decreased the cost and time it took to seek 
FDA approval for generic drugs. Before the passing of the Act, “only 35% of top-selling 
drugs with expired patents faced generic competition. By 1998, that number was close to 
100%” (Higgins et al., 2006). Since the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, when patents 
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expire, firms have started to lose their market share immediately. This has posed an 
enormous threat to the “blockbuster model” (Gilbert et al., 2003). 
The threats to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry have caused 
industry-wide excess capacity. Large firms face increased danger when patent cliffs 
approach and pipeline gaps widen. They have started to respond by participating in a 
large number of mergers and acquisitions. The big pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms are acquiring smaller firms in order to fill in their product line and fend off excess 
capacity (Austin, 2008).  
 I seek to determine whether or not investors are aware of the significant threat of 
excess capacity and if they view mergers and acquisitions as a solution to the problem. I 
will determine whether or not cumulative abnormal returns exist in a 5 day window 
around the day of the announcement of 194 deals from 2002 to 2008. I will then test to 
see the effect of financial measures of excess capacity on the cumulative abnormal 
returns. I predict that investors will respond positively to the news of a merger or 
acquisition. Investors will identify excess capacity as a problem facing the acquirer and 
respond positively when they hear that the firm is taking action to address the gaps in its 
pipeline. Therefore, I predict that excess capacity measures will have a positive effect on 
cumulative abnormal returns.  
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of previous 
literature related to mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industry, and in general; Section 3 describes the collection and use of data; Section 4 
discusses the methodology used in testing my hypothesis; Section 5 presents my 
empirical results; Section 6 discusses the implications of my results; Section 7 concludes.  
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Literature Review 
2.1 Excess Capacity Theory 
 Andrade and Stafford (2002) examine the economic role of mergers across 
multiple industries (not including the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry). In 
particular, they test whether or not mergers occur during times of industry-wide excess 
capacity, as is the case with the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry today. The 
authors’ measure of excess capacity is the percentage of total industry capacity that is 
actually utilized. Andrade et al. regress industry-wide capacity utilization against merger 
and non-merger investment and determined that a decrease in capacity utilization leads to 
an increase in merger activity across industries. Therefore, it appears that excess capacity 
has long been a determinant of merger activity.  
2.2 Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industry Excess Capacity   
Excess capacity is commonly proposed as a reason for pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms to engage is merger activity. Mergers and acquisitions are viewed as 
a response to the trend of decreasing research and development productivity across the 
industry. Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson (2007) test this theory in a two-stage analysis 
by first analyzing the propensity for firms to merge and then examining a merger’s effect 
on firm performance. Danzon et al. test the effects of Tobin’s Q, lagged sales growth and 
the number of marketed drugs in a firm’s pipeline (along with other excess capacity 
measures) on the propensity of a firm to engage in merger activity. The authors also 
divide the sample by firm size. They find that large firms have a higher propensity to 
undertake acquisitions if the firm has excess capacity characteristics. For small firms, the 
authors determine that merger activity is typically an exit solution for financially unstable 
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firms that do not exhibit characteristics of excess capacity. Danzon et al. also test the 
effect of a merger on various measures of firm performance, such as operating profit, 
sales and enterprise value. They find that performance is not different between firms that 
do and do not undertake acquisitions.  
 Higgins and Rodriguez (2005) also test the effect of excess capacity on the 
likelihood of acquisition in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. First, the 
authors create a desperation index for each firm in their sample. The index is created 
based on the exclusivity horizon of the firm’s pipeline and on a score of the “health” of 
their pipeline. A healthy pipeline is one that has many compounds in later stages, such as 
Phase II or Phase III, of development. The authors use the desperation index, along with 
other measures of excess capacity, such as research and development intensity and the 
number of alliances formed in a particular year, to determine its effect on the likelihood 
that a firm undertake an acquisition. Higgins et al. find that firms that are more desperate 
and have unhealthy pipelines are more likely to engage in merger activity. The authors 
also consider the effect of alliances on the cumulative abnormal return over a three day 
window around the announcement. It is hypothesized that the increase in access to 
information that results from an alliance would make the acquisition more beneficial. 
Indeed, Higgins et al. find that a previous alliance with the target leads to a larger 
cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer. The authors demonstrate that excess 
capacity, in the form of an unhealthy pipeline, causes firms to essentially outsource their 
research and development through the acquisition of smaller pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms.  
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 In his working paper, Ornaghi (2005) examines the effect of mergers in the 
pharmaceutical industry on not only firm performance, but also innovation in the merged 
firm and its competitors. Specifically, he tests the effects on research and development 
intensity, research productivity (the ratio of the number of patents to research and 
development expense) and returns to shareholders post-acquisition. He finds that mergers 
have a negative effect on each firm characteristic previously mentioned. The author 
concludes that mergers in the pharmaceutical industry actually decrease research and 
development productivity. Based on this evidence, pharmaceutical firms may be 
exacerbating the problems that affect the industry as a whole by participating in 
horizontal mergers. If we consider the possibility that pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms are responding to excess capacity and decreasing research and development 
productivity by merging, and that this activity may be further decreasing research and 
development productivity, we would expect to see investors to react negatively to the 
announcement of mergers. 
2.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) investigate the improvements in performance 
after mergers in the 50 largest US mergers between 1979 and 1984. In particular, the 
authors test to determine if abnormal returns at the announcement of the merger are a 
predictor of future improvements in post-acquisition performance. Healy et al. find a very 
positive relationship between abnormal returns at the announcement of a merger and an 
increase in operating cash flows after the merger. In addition, the authors found an even 
stronger relationship if the acquirer and target were in overlapping businesses. These 
results indicate that investors, in fact, anticipate the improvement in performance as a 
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result of a merger, especially if the acquirer and target are in the same business sector. In 
my sample, I only consider targets and acquirers in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industry. According to Healy et al. it is possible that I will find higher abnormal returns 
on the announcement date because of my restricted, same-industry deal list. 
 Prabhala (1997) analyzes the traditional and conditional methods in event studies. 
While describing the intuition behind conditional models, Prabhala notes the difference 
between the fact and the information the announcement reveals. In particular, the author 
notes that an announcement of acquisition from a firm with a history of acquisitions 
would not surprise investors. Therefore, abnormal returns are not expected in this case. It 
is when unexpected information is revealed in an announcement that abnormal returns are 
observed. In the case of my sample, if investors believe the firm should respond to, for 
example, excess capacity by undertaking an acquisition, abnormal returns are not 
expected. In addition, many pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies made multiple 
acquisitions in my sample period. According to Prabhala, this would decrease the 
likelihood of observing abnormal returns.  
Together, these studies address the questions surrounding the motivations behind 
mergers, the effects of mergers on firm performance and the expected reactions of 
investors upon the announcement of a merger. However, the existing literature does not 
address the actual reactions of investors, given all of this information, upon the 
announcement of a merger. There has been no research with data past 2004 to identify 
whether or not investors have responded to the emerging trend of merger activity 
positively or negatively. For example, investors may have reacted negatively to the news 
of an acquisition before the threat of excess capacity became readily apparent. Now, 
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however, they may have identified the problem and view acquisitions as a good solution 
to excess capacity. I examine the reactions of shareholders to the announcement of 
mergers in my sample of 194 deals between 2002 and 2008. I then determine whether or 
not the threat of excess capacity is recognized by the typical investor and what effect 
(positive or negative) it has stock return. Do investors expect pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies to merge if they face the risk of excess capacity? 
 
Data 
3.1 Acquisition Identification 
 I identify acquisitions using Bloomberg’s Mergers and Acquisitions Advanced 
Search feature. I search by Deal Type, Date Range, Region/Country, Sector/Industry and 
Public/Private. My initial list includes company takeovers announced between January 1, 
2002 and December 31, 2008, where the acquirer is a US-based, public firm, and both the 
acquirer and the target company are in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. 
Bloomberg identified 483 deals that met these search criteria. I then eliminate any deals 
classified as a divestiture, as I will not be able to collect pre-merger excess capacity 
measures (described in detail below) on subsidiaries of firms. I also do not consider firms 
with multiple acquirers because it would be impossible to determine how the target is 
divided among the acquirers. Finally, I search each acquiring firm and delete those who 
were considered to be in the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industry by Bloomberg, but 
do not fit the type of firm I am considering. For example, several firms produce 
nutritional products, owned pharmacies, or were involved in agricultural biotechnology.  
These firms have different business models and are subject to different regulations in 
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approval of products than the pure big pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms. Finally, I 
do not eliminate deals that were terminated after the announcement date, as I want to 
avoid selection bias. After narrowing down my list of firms, my final list is comprised of 
150 firms participating in 194 deals.  
3.2 Event Study Data Collection 
 To complete my event study, I collect daily closing prices for each firm from 
October 1, 2001 to December 31, 2008 from Bloomberg. I also collect closing prices for 
the S&P 500 index for the same date range. I then calculate return manually for the 
individual firms and the S&P 500 index using (P1 – P0)/P0. I calculate return manually 
because for many of the companies, no price was recorded for various trading days. I 
need the period for which the return is calculated to be consistent across the index and the 
firm to which it is compared.  
3.3 Excess Capacity Data Collection 
 I also use Bloomberg to collect sales and research and development expense for 
each firm from three years before the announcement of the acquisition to the year of the 
announcement. I use research and development expense divided by sales as a measure of 
research and development intensity. In addition, I use sales growth as a measure of excess 
capacity.  Finally, I collect the book value of assets, long term debt and market value of 
equity for each firm the year before the announcement. I then calculate Tobin’s Q for 
each firm, using the equation, (long term debt + market value of equity)/(book value of 
total assets) (Danzon et al., 2007). 
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Methodology 
4.1 Event Study 
 To determine the effect of the announcement of a merger or acquisition on the 
pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms in my sample, I run an event study and calculate 
the abnormal return on the day of the announcement. I follow a typical event study as 
explained by the Data and Statistical Services at Princeton University and edited by 
Professors Henrik Cronqvist and Darren Filson. I use the announcement of the merger as 
the event date and the S&P 500 index as the market returns to which the returns of each 
individual firm will be compared. I start by calculating the event window for each firm, 
which includes a total of five days – two days before the event, the day of the event and 
two days after the event. I use a small event window because I do not want to 
inadvertently consider events besides the announcement of the merger or acquisition. I 
then calculate the estimation window for each firm, which includes sixty days before to 
ten days before the event date for the firm returns and the market returns. I set up the 
estimation window in order to compare the firm returns to market returns and find the 
correlation between the two. I am then able to estimate the market model and predict firm 
returns. 
 I predict the firm returns from the market model in order to determine whether or 
not the returns actually observed on the event date were expected. If there is no difference 
between the returns observed on the event date and the returns predicted by the market 
model, then the announcement of the acquisition did not cause any abnormal returns for 
shareholders. That is, the announcement of the merger did not increase or decrease value 
for the shareholders of the firm in the form of unexpected stock returns.  
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 After predicting the firms’ returns, I compute the abnormal return by comparing 
the actual return to that predicted by the market. I then calculate the t-statistic for each 
event and across all events. I finish my event study with cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) and a t-statistic for each event and for all of the events together. 
4.2 Excess Capacity Measures 
 I use three financial measures that indicate excess capacity in a pharmaceutical or 
biotechnology firm, as used by previous research (Higgins et al., 2005 and Danzon et al., 
2007). First, I consider the intensity of a firm’s research and development, as measured 
by the firm’s research and development expense as a percent of sales. As mentioned 
previously, research and development productivity in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industry has largely declined over the past decade. Therefore, it is safe to 
make the assumption that a firm with large research and development investment is at 
higher risk for research and development deterioration, causing the firm to look to 
acquire new compounds and products in order to develop and fill the pipeline. As proven 
by Higgins et al., firms with higher research and development have a higher propensity to 
undertake acquisitions. 
 Second, I use the change in sales growth from three years prior to the 
announcement to one year prior to the announcement as a measure of excess capacity. As 
patent cliffs arrive for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, they face increased 
competition from generic drugs. The generics rapidly gain market share and diminish 
sales for the original producers of the brand-name drug. Therefore, a consistent decrease 
in sales can be an indication of excess capacity for a pharmaceutical or biotechnology 
firm. The firms no longer have patent protection and have gaps in their product pipelines. 
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Danzon et al. use lagged sales growth as a measure of excess capacity to demonstrate 
that, regardless of the size of the firm, slower growth of sales greatly increased the 
propensity for a firm to merge as a response to distress on the firm from excess capacity.  
 I use Tobin’s Q (market value of assets to book value of assets) as the final 
measure of excess capacity. Tobin’s Q is sensitive to changes in the value of intangible 
assets and, therefore, is a good measure of excess capacity for pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms. As the firms face competition from generics and their patent cliffs 
arrive, the value of their patents and compounds decrease. This should change the market 
value of their assets, which would be reflected in the Tobin’s Q. Both Higgins et al. and 
Danzon et al. both use Tobin’s Q as a measure of excess capacity and find that a lower 
Tobin’s Q is associated with a firm undertaking an acquisition.  
 
Results 
5.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
I estimate predicted returns for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms in my 
sample by comparing stock returns to market returns from sixty days to ten days before 
the announcement of an acquisition. I then regress actual returns on the returns I predict 
for each firm during the event window. Tables 2.1-2.3 report summary statistics for the 
cumulative abnormal returns calculated. Across all events, the average cumulative 
abnormal return was -0.00587% with a standard deviation of 0.127%. Cumulative 
abnormal returns range from -0.481% to 0.652%. From 2002-2004, the average 
cumulative abnormal return was 0.000809%, and from 2005-2008, the average 
cumulative abnormal return was 0.0108593%. While cumulative abnormal returns are not 
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significant across all of the events in my sample, I still use them to test excess capacity 
measures. It is possible that there is cross-sectional variation in my sample due to excess 
capacity. Therefore, the cumulative abnormal returns’ lack of significance does not 
matter in this case. 
 One possible error in my event study is the fact that the beta estimated by the 
estimation window can clearly be incorrect. In that case, all of the abnormal returns 
calculated based on predicted returns could also be incorrect. Brown and Warner (1985) 
test to see how the characteristics specific to daily returns affect the results of event 
study. The authors determine that standard methodologies (such as the one utilized in this 
paper) are so well-specified that daily data generally have no effect on results. Therefore, 
the worry of a false beta is mitigated by the fact that I use daily data for a short-run event 
study.  
5.2 The Effect of Excess Capacity on Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Table 4 reports the effect of excess capacity measures on the cumulative abnormal 
returns calculated in my event study. The results support the hypothesis that investors 
respond positively to an acquisition undertaken as a response to excess capacity. I use 
three different variables to measure excess capacity: R&D intensity (research and 
development as a percent of sales) for three years before, two years before, one year 
before and the year of the announcement, sales growth from three years before to one 
year before the announcement, and Tobin’s Q for one year before the announcement. For 
the entire sample, all deals announced between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2008, 
R&D intensity and Tobin’s Q the year of the announcement are significant. A 100% 
increase in R&D intensity two years before the announcement leads to a 0.00120% 
14 
 
 
increase in cumulative abnormal returns. The average R&D intensity two years before the 
announcement is 499%. Assuming sales for that average firm is constant at $100,000 and 
research and development expense is about $50 million, an increase in research and 
development expense of $10 million (to $60 million) would increase cumulative 
abnormal return over the event window by 0.00120%. In addition, a 100% increase in 
Tobin’s Q the year of the announcement leads to a 0.000747% increase in cumulative 
abnormal returns.  
Investors recognize the danger big pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies 
face when they exhibit characteristics of excess capacity and do not respond to them. 
When a firm’s sales slow, they are most likely facing increased competition from generic 
drugs. Investors have started to recognize this characteristic of excess capacity and 
reward the firm when they respond by acquiring new compounds. 
While the excess capacity theory suggests that Tobin’s Q should have a negative 
relationship with cumulative abnormal returns, a positive correlation does not necessarily 
contradict the theory. A large Tobin’s Q is an indication that a firm can finance an 
acquisition due to its relatively high stock price (Danzon et al., 2007). Therefore, a 
positive relationship can simply indicate that the financing effect of Tobin’s Q is 
outweighing the excess capacity effect of the measure. 
Tables 5 and 6 report the effects of excess capacity on cumulative abnormal 
returns in the first and second half of the sample (2002-2004 and 2005-2008), 
respectively. I divide the results by period in order to determine whether or not investors 
begin to recognize excess capacity as reason for a merger. Especially given the fact that 
the results across the entire period are somewhat inconclusive, it is necessary to see if 
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investor behavior changes as more mergers are announced and as time passes to 
determine whether or not these mergers actually improve firm and shareholder value.  
When broken down by period, I receive different results for the excess capacity 
measures I consider. For the early period, deals announced between January 1, 2002 and 
December 31, 2004, only sales growth and Tobin’s Q are significant in the final 
regression. In addition, there is a positive relationship between sales growth and 
cumulative abnormal return. Specifically, a 100% increase in sales growth means an 
increase of 0.00178% in cumulative abnormal return. The average sales growth for firms 
announcing deals between 2002 and 2004 is 526%. Assuming sales for this average firm 
in year t-3 is constant at $1 million and sales in year t-1 is $6.26 million, then an increase 
of $1 million in sales (to $7.26 million) would increase cumulative abnormal return in the 
event window by 0.00178%. This contradicts the excess capacity theory, as an increase in 
sales growth indicates that new products are being marketed and that generics have not 
begun to decrease market share. Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with cumulative 
abnormal returns, which also contradicts the excess capacity theory. A 100% increase in 
Tobin’s Q leads to a 0.00159% increase in cumulative abnormal return. As mentioned 
previously, Tobin’s Q can be reflective of not only excess capacity, but also ability to 
finance acquisitions. These results suggest that from 2002 to 2004, investors did not 
acknowledge mergers and acquisitions as an appropriate response to excess capacity 
issues. This is not to say that investors did not recognize the rapid research and 
development deterioration and decrease in research and development productivity that 
plagues the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. Instead, investors did not see 
mergers and acquisitions as a solution to the problem. It is worthwhile to note that while 
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results do change for the years 2005-2008 (as explained below) I am not suggesting that 
acquisitions in response to excess capacity do, in fact, add value. 
As displayed in Table 6, the results for deals announced between January 1, 2005 
and December 31, 2008 support the theory that investors reward firms for responding to 
excess capacity with mergers and acquisitions. Larger research and development intensity 
increases cumulative abnormal return. A 100% increase in research and development 
intensity (research and development expense as a percent of sales) increases cumulative 
abnormal returns by 0.00125%. The average research and development intensity in year 
t-2 for firms announcing deals between 2005 and 2008 is 460%. Therefore, for the 
average firm, assuming research and development expense in year t-2 is $46 million and 
sales is constant at $100,000, an increase in research and development expense of $10 
million (to $56 million) would lead to an increase in cumulative abnormal return during 
the event window of 0.00125%. In addition, a decrease in sales growth from three years 
before the announcement to one year before the announcement increases cumulative 
abnormal returns upon the announcement of an acquisition. A 100% decrease in sales 
growth during this time period increases cumulative abnormal returns by 0.000541%. 
The average sales growth for firms announcing deals between 2005 and 2008 is 450%. 
Therefore, assuming that sales in year t-3 is $1 million and in year t-1 is $5.5 million, a 
decrease in sales of $1 million in year t-1 (to $4.5 million) would lead to an increase in 
cumulative abnormal return over the event window of 0.000541%. When investors 
acknowledge that a firm suffers from excess capacity, they respond positively to the 
announcement of an acquisition.  
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 Discussion 
 When considering my sample as a whole, it is difficult to draw conclusions as to 
the effect of excess capacity on cumulative abnormal returns. While research and 
development intensity appears to play a role in increasing cumulative abnormal return 
over the event window around the announcement date, the positive relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and cumulative abnormal return sheds some doubt on the real impact of excess 
capacity. However, a larger Tobin’s Q can demonstrate a firm’s ability to finance an 
acquisition. Therefore, it appears that investors respond positively to the announcement 
of a merger when a firm demonstrates excess capacity characteristics and is able to 
finance the acquisition. 
 After dividing the sample by date, it appears that investors’ recognition of 
acquisitions as a response to excess capacity changed from 2002 to 2008. In the first half 
of the sample, from 2002-2004, investors do not appear to react to the announcement of 
acquisitions as a firm’s response to excess capacity. Instead, the results demonstrate that 
if the firm has the ability to finance an acquisition, as seen through positive sales growth 
and a large Tobin’s Q, investors react positively to the announcement of the acquisition. 
On the other hand, from 2005-2008, excess capacity does appear to have an effect on 
cumulative abnormal return. Research and development intensity is positively correlated 
with cumulative abnormal returns. Investors acknowledge that a higher research and 
development investment leaves the firm at a higher risk and likelihood of deterioration. 
Sales growth is negatively correlated with cumulative abnormal returns, again 
demonstrating that when investors acknowledge a firm’s excess capacity they react 
positively to the announcement of a merger, as it serves as a solution for the firm. Again, 
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it is hypothesized that the acquirers in my sample face the threat of excess capacity and 
do not have the pipeline to maintain sales. Therefore, they respond by acquiring smaller 
firms whose assets, such as their compounds and discovery technologies, will help fill in 
the acquirers’ gaps. The results demonstrate that over the period of 2002 to 2008, 
investors began to realize that acquisitions were, in fact, a response to excess capacity. 
Therefore, from 2005 to 2008, investors react positively to the news of an acquisition 
when they observe characteristics of excess capacity in the firm.  
 While these trends are supported by the results, the cumulative abnormal returns 
are not significant across all events. This means that the announcement of an acquisition 
by a big pharmaceutical or biotechnology firm was anticipated by investors. Previous 
literature has consistently proven that excess capacity increases a firm’s propensity to 
participate in merger activity. Danzon et al. and Higgins et al. use the same excess 
capacity measures to predict the probability that a firm will acquire a company. My 
results demonstrate that investors now expect that firms respond to excess capacity by 
acquiring firms and filling in their pipeline gaps.  
 
 Conclusion 
 I analyzed investors’ reaction to the announcement of an acquisition in 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology deals from 2002 to 2008. I used an event study to 
determine the size of the reaction to the news of the event and calculated cumulative 
abnormal returns. I then tested whether or not the threat of excess capacity in a firm had 
an effect on cumulative abnormal returns. I investigated how the investors reacted when 
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they recognized this excess capacity threat using financial measures, such as Tobin’s Q, 
sales growth, and research and development intensity. 
 Across all events, cumulative abnormal returns were not different from zero. This 
indicated that from 2002 to 2008, investors anticipated the announcement of an 
acquisition from the firms in my sample. When testing to find the effect of excess 
capacity on the cumulative abnormal returns, I found that it was not clear whether a 
relationship existed or not. However, when breaking the sample into an early and late 
period, a trend in investor behavior appeared. From 2002 to 2004, investors reacted to the 
announcement of an acquisition as if the threat of excess capacity was not recognized. 
That is, if the firm demonstrated the financial ability to fund an acquisition, investors 
responded positively. Excess capacity measures were not statistically significant in this 
period. However, from 2005-2008, investors responded positively to the announcement 
of an acquisition when the firm faced excess capacity. This indicates that investors began 
to recognize that firms were responding to gaps in their pipelines and the approaching of 
patent cliffs by acquiring smaller firms and their products.  
 No determination can be made from these results about the actual value added to 
the firm and its shareholders after the acquisition occurred. In addition, the trend of 
excess capacity recognition apparent from 2005 to 2008 does not mean that the 
acquisitions that took place between 2002 and 2004 were successful in mitigating the 
effect of excess capacity. My results simply demonstrate that investors begin to 
acknowledge the threat of excess capacity and react differently to the announcement of 
an acquisition.  
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Table 1 – Definition of Variables 
List of Variables 
Variable Definition             
                
cumulative_abnormal_return Cumulative abnormal returns 
rdt3 R&D as a percent of sales three years before the announcement 
rdt2 R&D as a percent of sales two years before the announcement 
rdt1 R&D as a percent of sales one year before the announcement 
rdt R&D as a percent of sales the year of the announcement 
change_sg Sales growth from three years before to one year before the announcement 
qt1 Tobin's Q one year before the announcement 
mc Market Capitalization the year of the announcement     
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Table 2.1 – Summary Statistics 2002-2008 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cumulative_abnormal_return 194 -0.0058674 0.1270811 -0.4806167 0.6520224 
rdt3 193 6.650784 33.56538 0 317.7097 
rdt2 194 4.898271 25.82638 0 269.5548 
rdt1 192 6.472064 56.2134 0 774.925 
rdt 184 6.50223 46.80435 0 567.0787 
change_sg 194 4.827146 27.80351 -1 296.9107 
qt1 194 20.97949 24.86845 0.2359125 193.1889 
mc 189 26938.52 48999.22 0.2211089 200949 
 
 
Table 2.2 – Summary Statistics 2002-2004 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cumulative_abnormal_return 83 0.0008085 0.1467298 -0.3240206 0.6520224 
rdt3 83 7.564609 35.23176 0 310.4546 
rdt2 83 5.296048 29.78497 0 269.5548 
rdt1 82 3.372066 8.254612 0.0269495 46.68085 
rdt 78 5.058296 28.29142 0.0279523 250.0899 
change_sg 83 5.261908 25.6838 -0.9756 170.7039 
qt1 83 22.7243 27.82509 0.520613 193.1889 
mc 80 18871.9 42941.21 5.48555 200949 
 
 
Table 2.3 – Summary Statistics 2005-2008 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cumulative_abnormal_return 111 -0.0108593 0.1105762 -0.4806167 0.4306238 
rdt3 110 5.961262 32.39769 0 317.7097 
rdt2 111 4.600834 22.5555 0 219.8401 
rdt1 110 8.782972 73.98581 0 774.925 
rdt 106 7.564748 56.81842 0 567.0787 
change_sg 111 4.502054 29.39952 -1 296.9107 
qt1 111 19.67481 22.44791 0.2359125 163.4788 
mc 109 32858.97 52411.79 0.2211089 184511.6 
 
 
25 
 
 
Table 3 – Correlation Matrix 
 
  CARs* rdt3 rdt2 rdt1 rdt change_sg qt1 mc 
CARs* 1               
rdt3 -0.0071 1             
rdt2 0.2585 0.2353 1           
rdt1 -0.0754 0.0625 0.0236 1         
rdt -0.0729 0.2338 0.0499 0.9808 1       
change_sg -0.1785 0.3684 0.0916 -0.0293 -0.0195 1     
qt1 -0.0932 -0.1253 -0.0905 0.6153 0.5841 -0.1235 1   
mc 0.1084 -0.1185 -0.1185 -0.0769 -0.0845 -0.1179 -0.1953 1 
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Table 4 – 2002-2008: The effect of excess capacity measures on cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES cumulative_abnormal_return cumulative_abnormal_return 
      
rdt3 -0.000315 
(0.000383) 
rdt2 0.00132*** 0.00120*** 
(0.000432) (0.000344) 
rdt1 -0.000828** 
(0.000385) 
rdt 0.000674 
(0.000469) 
change_sg 0.000785 
(0.000609) 
qt1 0.00125*** 0.000747** 
(0.000414) (0.000357) 
mc 2.05e-07 
(1.80e-07) 
Constant -0.0444*** -0.0274** 
(0.0138) (0.0118) 
Observations 183 194 
R-squared 0.129 0.075 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 – 2002-2004: The effect of excess capacity measures on cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES cumulative_abnormal_return cumulative_abnormal_return 
      
rdt3 -0.00116 
(0.00219) 
rdt2 0.00159 
(0.00214) 
rdt1 -0.000868 
(0.00197) 
rdt 0.000702 
(0.000546) 
change_sg 0.00186 0.00178*** 
(0.00113) (0.000581) 
qt1 0.00209*** 0.00159*** 
(0.000621) (0.000536) 
mc 1.73e-08 
(3.58e-07) 
Constant -0.0544** -0.0446** 
(0.0244) (0.0195) 
Observations 78 83 
R-squared 0.239 0.177 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 – 2005-2008: The effect of excess capacity measures on cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES cumulative_abnormal_return cumulative_abnormal_return 
      
rdt3 0.000978 
(0.000960) 
rdt2 0.00124*** 0.00125*** 
(0.000464) (0.000470) 
rdt1 0.00187 
(0.00188) 
rdt -0.00270 
(0.00259) 
change_sg -0.00336** -0.000541 
(0.00154) (0.000361) 
qt1 -7.56e-05 
(0.000590) 
mc 2.35e-07 
(1.96e-07) 
Constant -0.0227 -0.0142 
(0.0180) (0.0105) 
Observations 105 111 
R-squared 0.139 0.068 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
